By Ismael G. Khan Jr.
TWO very recent decisions of the Supreme Court on the complex issues separating Church and State, promulgated within days of each other, have been virtually lost in the fury and frenzy unleashed by the aborted putsch of young and disgruntled military turks amid the smoke swirling around in the run-up to the national elections in 2004.
The first decision nullified an act of the President, which the Court said crossed the line separating Church and State. The case of Islamic Dawah vs Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003) is notable for another reason. It was penned for a unanimous court by Justice Renato C. Corona who, according to critics of the Court, could not be depended on to decide cases against the Chief Executive whom he had previously served as chief of staff and presidential legal counsel before she appointed him to the Supreme Court. That "utang na loob" [debt of gratitude] did not stop him and the high court from declaring Executive Order No. 46, s. 2001 as a violation of the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
The said executive order established the Philippine Halal Certification scheme whereby the government, through the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), was to determine what food products were fit to be eaten by Muslims. This is the principal activity of the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines (IDCP), a nongovernmental organization, which issues halal certifications for food products manufactured in the Philippines. After the executive order was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with the IDCP shifted their requirements for halal certification to the OMA. Consequently, the IDCP lost substantial income, which is why it petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the OMA, a government agency, from undertaking a purely religious function involving Islamic religious rites and prayers performed by imams and Muslim scholars.
The Supreme Court upheld the IDCP's arguments and contention. It ruled that, without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The justices pointed out that OMA was created to integrate Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions, and to deal with the Muslim community as a national cultural community and not as a religious group. To interpret it differently will violate the establishment clause and free exercise clause which comprise the linchpin of the hallowed doctrine of Church-State dichotomy.
The establishment and free exercise clauses are stated quite clearly in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The principal purpose of these clauses, which are complementary, is to promote and protect religious liberty. They are imbued with a secular purpose that does not promote or inhibit religion. They are aimed at preventing the government from imposing orthodoxy, or prescribing arbitrary parameters in ensuring freedom of worship.
For example, the fact that we are a predominantly Catholic nation does not justify applying the moral standards of the Catholic faith in judging the moral norms of other established religions.
This principle figured prominently in the resolution of the second case, Estrada vs Escritor (A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003). Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in the Las Piñas regional trial court, was accused of cohabiting with a certain Luciano Quilapio, while they were still married to other persons. Their relationship of 23 years had borne a son. The complainant, Alejandro Estrada, alleged that this constituted disgraceful and immoral conduct under existing laws and civil service rules. In her defense, Escritor claimed that as members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, their living together had the approval of their sect as proven by a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which they executed in 1991. By virtue of this act, their union was legitimized by the Jehovah's Witnesses and they were, therefore, to be regarded as husband and wife. Ergo, no violation of any law or rule as this would be an unconstitutional violation of their religious freedom.
Speaking through Justice Reynato S. Puno, eight justices of the Supreme Court, a simple majority, sided with Escritor and remanded the case to the Office of the Court Administrator, and ordered the Solicitor General to examine her claimed religious belief and practice and to present evidence in justifying an exception to prevailing law and jurisprudence governing illicit relations.
In other words, the decision shows that the Supreme Court is prepared to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality in its interpretation of the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses of the Constitution, unless it can be demonstrably proven that there is compelling state interest that would negate such an accommodation, such as a clear and present danger to established institutions of society and the law.
The far-reaching significance of this decision can readily be gleaned from the fact that if Escritor were not a Jehovah's Witness, her actuations and behavior would indeed constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, as well as adultery and concubinage, under prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Ismael G. Khan Jr. is assistant court administrator and chief of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court.
TWO very recent decisions of the Supreme Court on the complex issues separating Church and State, promulgated within days of each other, have been virtually lost in the fury and frenzy unleashed by the aborted putsch of young and disgruntled military turks amid the smoke swirling around in the run-up to the national elections in 2004.
The first decision nullified an act of the President, which the Court said crossed the line separating Church and State. The case of Islamic Dawah vs Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim Affairs (G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003) is notable for another reason. It was penned for a unanimous court by Justice Renato C. Corona who, according to critics of the Court, could not be depended on to decide cases against the Chief Executive whom he had previously served as chief of staff and presidential legal counsel before she appointed him to the Supreme Court. That "utang na loob" [debt of gratitude] did not stop him and the high court from declaring Executive Order No. 46, s. 2001 as a violation of the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
The said executive order established the Philippine Halal Certification scheme whereby the government, through the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), was to determine what food products were fit to be eaten by Muslims. This is the principal activity of the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines (IDCP), a nongovernmental organization, which issues halal certifications for food products manufactured in the Philippines. After the executive order was implemented, food manufacturers with existing contracts with the IDCP shifted their requirements for halal certification to the OMA. Consequently, the IDCP lost substantial income, which is why it petitioned the Supreme Court to prohibit the OMA, a government agency, from undertaking a purely religious function involving Islamic religious rites and prayers performed by imams and Muslim scholars.
The Supreme Court upheld the IDCP's arguments and contention. It ruled that, without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The justices pointed out that OMA was created to integrate Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions, and to deal with the Muslim community as a national cultural community and not as a religious group. To interpret it differently will violate the establishment clause and free exercise clause which comprise the linchpin of the hallowed doctrine of Church-State dichotomy.
The establishment and free exercise clauses are stated quite clearly in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The principal purpose of these clauses, which are complementary, is to promote and protect religious liberty. They are imbued with a secular purpose that does not promote or inhibit religion. They are aimed at preventing the government from imposing orthodoxy, or prescribing arbitrary parameters in ensuring freedom of worship.
For example, the fact that we are a predominantly Catholic nation does not justify applying the moral standards of the Catholic faith in judging the moral norms of other established religions.
This principle figured prominently in the resolution of the second case, Estrada vs Escritor (A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug. 4, 2003). Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in the Las Piñas regional trial court, was accused of cohabiting with a certain Luciano Quilapio, while they were still married to other persons. Their relationship of 23 years had borne a son. The complainant, Alejandro Estrada, alleged that this constituted disgraceful and immoral conduct under existing laws and civil service rules. In her defense, Escritor claimed that as members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, their living together had the approval of their sect as proven by a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which they executed in 1991. By virtue of this act, their union was legitimized by the Jehovah's Witnesses and they were, therefore, to be regarded as husband and wife. Ergo, no violation of any law or rule as this would be an unconstitutional violation of their religious freedom.
Speaking through Justice Reynato S. Puno, eight justices of the Supreme Court, a simple majority, sided with Escritor and remanded the case to the Office of the Court Administrator, and ordered the Solicitor General to examine her claimed religious belief and practice and to present evidence in justifying an exception to prevailing law and jurisprudence governing illicit relations.
In other words, the decision shows that the Supreme Court is prepared to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality in its interpretation of the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses of the Constitution, unless it can be demonstrably proven that there is compelling state interest that would negate such an accommodation, such as a clear and present danger to established institutions of society and the law.
The far-reaching significance of this decision can readily be gleaned from the fact that if Escritor were not a Jehovah's Witness, her actuations and behavior would indeed constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct, as well as adultery and concubinage, under prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Ismael G. Khan Jr. is assistant court administrator and chief of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court.
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